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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ULLET

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

State Department review completed

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27 August 1964

#### CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN


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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

27 August 1964

### DAILY BRIEF

\*South Vietnam: The apparent inability of the Military Revolutionary Council (MRC) to agree on a new chief of state reflects serious internal divisions.

An unconfirmed report states that the MRC voted to dissolve itself after selecting a temporary, three-man triumvirate composed of Generals Khanh, Minh and Khiem. The mission of the present government is to oversee the election, within 60 days, of a national congress which, in turn, would select a new chief of state.

According to General Khanh, early opposition developed within the MRC to his plan to have the MRC dissolve itself. His opposition stemmed primarily from officers with Dai Viet Party ties with Defense Minister General Khiem playing both sides. The reported selection of a three-man triumvirate appears to be a stop-gap solution to try to reconcile three factions within the MRC while holding out a promise of a more popularly representative government.

It is by no means certain that the MRC action will stabilize the current situation. The political influence of General Khiem is probably unacceptable to the Buddhist leadership. Demonstrations in the northern cities of Hue and Danang have reflected a strong suspicion of MRC intentions and violence has persisted in Danang.

(Continued)

Public tensions are likely to be heightened by reported firing by troops on Catholic demonstrators in Saigon, who were demanding retention of the MRC under General Khanh.

There have been unconfirmed reports of a possible military coup by Dai Viet officers who control units within striking distance of Saigon. Speculation on such a move has been expressed by the armored commander, the Buddhists, and by Khanh himself.


Although Communist military activity continued to increase gradually this week, no specific Viet Cong military exploitation of the current crisis has yet been noted.

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# CYPRUS



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27 Parg 64 For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007800450001-6

25X1 Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007800450001-6 Cyprus: President Makarios has again called for union of Cyprus with Greece despite his general hostility to the idea. In formally receiving the new Greek ambassador to Cyprus yesterday, Makarios publicly expressed the hope that enosis "without conditions or exchanges" would soon take place. The communiqué issued following the Makarios-Papandreou meeting in Athens on 25 August did not mention this subject, however. Makarios renewed commitment to enosis may be at least in part an attempt to counter the reported 25X1 plots against his regime. 25X1 25X1 Grivas apparently remains firm in supporting the concept of enosis, with a NATO base including Turkish troops being established on (continued) 3 DAILY BRIEF 27 Aug 64 25X1 Approved for Release 2003/01/29: CIA-RDP79T00975A007800450001-6

Cyprus. If Makarios continues to oppose this type of settlement and to flirt with the Soviet Union, Grivas is said to be ready to "bring about such a solution over the objections of Makarios."/

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members of the Communist Party or other leftist groups-violently opposed to such a solution--are inclined to use their arms against anyone who proposes such a settlement./

UN Secretary General Thant, meanwhile, has complained that Turkish jets recently were observed overflying the territorial waters of Cyprus in violation of Ankara's commitment at the time of the cease fire. He advised the Turkish UN representative that rotation of part of the Turkish contingent on Cyprus, scheduled for 31 August, would be easier if the Turkish soldiers on the island would return to the Nicosia barracks. Unless they did so the UN could not provide escort and security for the rotation. Ambassador Belcher has warned that this planned rotation could

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bring on the next crisis.

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Rumania-USSR: Rumania apparently still hopes to get Moscow to alter, if not abandon, its plans for a preparatory conference of 26 Communist parties next December.

Bucharest reportedly refused to give Soviet trouble-shooter Podgorny assurances during his 27-28 July visit that they would participate in such a meeting. Rumania also remains the only Eastern European country not to publish the text of Moscow's 10 August proposal to hold the meeting. During a series of recent press conferences, Rumanian officials at home and abroad have refused to commit themselves when asked if Bucharest would attend the conference.

Bucharest may also hope by these tactics to gain the support of other Soviet-oriented Communist parties in opposing the proposal for the conference. This may have been part of the purpose of a memorandum the Rumanians reportedly circulated in early August concerning various aspects of its relations with the USSR.

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#### NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

The United States Intelligence Board on 26 August 1964 approved the following national intelligence estimates:

	SNIE 13-4-64,	"The Chances of an Imminent Communist Chinese Nuclear Ex- plosion."	25X1
25X1	NIE 11-6-64,	"Soviet Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to Biological Warfare."	25X1

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The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

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The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

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The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

#### The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

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Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

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Commander in Chief, Atlantic

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